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Abstract. Economics of scale in Internet of Things (IoT) presents new security 
challenges for ubiquitous devices in terms of authentication, addressing and 
embedded security. Currently available cryptographic techniques require further 
analysis to determine applicability to IoT. We introduce an authentication and 
encryption protocol which serves as a proof of concept for authenticating device 
using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) – Galois/ Counter Mode GCM 
as cryptographic primitive. Authenticated encryption is best suited concept for 
IoT that will provide both message encryption and authentication. Unique part 
of this work is a novel approach of extending authentication and encryption 
with cryptographic capabilities. 
Keywords: Authentication, Access Control, Capability, Embedded Security, 
Cryptography, Addressing. 
1   Introduction 
IoT is service oriented architecture with resource constraints and is a mandatory 
subset of future internet where every virtual or physical device can communicate with 
every other device giving seamless service to all stakeholders. IoT is convergence of 
resource constrained sensors, RFID, smart devices and any object with sensing, 
computing and communication capability. These devices can interact with the user 
and among themselves, to provide secure services or information. These interactions 
will further extend the need for privacy and security models to include how users 
interact with devices, and how these devices will interact among themselves. In IoT 
basic challenge is to identify or address and authenticate individual devices. So to 
identify individual device we need to have some addressing mechanism by which we 
can address or access particular device. For unique identification already some 
techniques are available, like for computer system identification, there is ipv4 
protocol, but again, as it is 32 bit address, these are less as compared to number of 
increasing devices. To avoid this limitation new protocol was introduced i.e. IPV6 
(128 bit). Challenges for having unique authentication and access control solution for 
different devices around us like home appliances fridge, mixer, washing machine, 
Television etc in IoT are daunting.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 talks about the Security consideration 
for IoT. Section 3 analyzes related work. Section 4 describes the AES-GCM which is 
an efficient authenticated encryption algorithm. Section 5 proposes a device capability 
based addressing and authentication protocol which achieves authentication, 
encryption and access control. Section 6 evaluates the proposed protocol in terms of 
its efficiency. Section 7 concludes the paper with future scope. 
2   Security Considerations for IoT 
Devices like RFID or sensor node themselves have no access control function, so 
they can freely obtain information from each other.  As a result, an authentication as 
well as authorization scheme must be established between devices so as to achieve the 
security goals for IoT.  In RFID, tag security issue related to the scenario, like the 
communication between a tag and a reader which is by radio, anyone can access the 
tag and obtains its output, i.e. attackers can eavesdrop on the communication channel 
between tags and readers, which is a cause of consumer’s apprehension.  So the 
authentication scheme employed in RFID must be able to protect the data passing 
between the tag and the reader, i.e. the security solution itself should have some kind 
of encryption capability.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Authentication schemes 
 
Authentication is related to secure identification of devices in which there is need for 
verification of identity possession. Every act of an access control will enable 
authentication process. So, secure identity establishment is a promising in nomadic 
IoT which prone to many threats [1-2]. Authentication with encryption can solve all 
of the former mentioned security threats in IoT scenario like RFID and sensor 
Networks applications. 
Broadly there are three authentication schemes: password systems (weak 
authentication), challenge-response authentication (strong authentication), and 
customized and zero-knowledge authentication [3]. Password systems offers a weak 
level of security and zero-knowledge techniques are often related to “strong” 
mathematical problems which are very costly in calculation and implementation. So 
we aim for the second type, the challenge-response techniques, which are broadly 
used. There are asymmetric and symmetric challenge-response techniques. The 
disadvantage of asymmetric authentication methods is that they are very time 
consuming and costly to implement in hardware. So, they are not the first choice for 
resource constraints devices. This classification is shown in figure 1.  
3   Related Work 
A number of different authentication and access control schemes exist in the literature 
but each addressing different devices. In sensor networks a multitude of sensors 
communicate as peers with each other and each sensor is constrained in its 
computational power, which precludes use of asymmetric cryptography. Here secret 
key schemes are used to create authenticated communication relations between 
certain nodes. Due to the peer-to-peer communication model there are multiple 
possible paths between each node. Statistical considerations are used to reduce the 
number of necessary node-pair secrets while still guaranteeing secure paths between 
any arbitrary pair of nodes. The main research focus in sensor network authentication 
is on resiliency in the face of partly compromised network [4].  In [5], author 
proposes two factor time efficient authentication schemes with session key 
establishment only for users and devices are left unaddressed. In [6] and [7] , author 
have proposed authentication and access control protocol which is prone to active 
attacks and message interception and not suited to resource constrained IOT.  Hash 
function based mutual authentication protocol for RFID is given in [8] but key 
management issue is left unaddressed as it is most important issue as per [9]. 
Researchers have proposed numerous protection mechanisms, but none prevents an 
attacker from retrieving secure information [10]. There are many protocol proposals 
that use hash functions and mutual authentication [11], [12] but they perform weakly 
during tracking and are not suitable for resource constrained devices. There are other 
proposals like SPKI [13], [14] which is a public key based authentication and access 
control protocol and authentication message format. Main focus is on sophisticated 
rights delegation and derivation algorithms. SPKI provides no means for session 
protection against tampering or replay and it is not suited for private IoT. SAML [15] 
is an XML based syntax for encoding capabilities, which may potentially be used 
within the context of the protocol described in this paper to transport capabilities, but 
is limited due to the fact that standard SAML can only express yes/no type of access 
decisions, no complex permission statements and policy enforcement.  
Aforementioned literature shows that there is advancement in research for 
authentication and encryption, but device to device communication is left 
unaddressed. Also solution for incorporating on device security in the resource 
constrained devices is an open issue. 
4    Authentication and encryption using AES-GCM 
Authenticated encryption is evolving as a relatively new concept that will provide 
both message encryption and authentication which can be adapted for embedding 
security in device. AES-GCM is one of the latest authenticated encryption algorithms 
providing both confidentiality and authenticity suitable for hardware implementation. 
AES-GCM accepts four inputs namely symmetric key, Initialization vector (IV), 
Plaintext and an optional field for authenticating data. The output of AES-GSM is the 
cipher text and the message. The Initialization Vector (IV) is generated by the device 
performing the authenticated encryption operation. It can also be a nonce within the 
scope of any authenticated encryption key with uniqueness. Repeating nonce for two 
different messages encrypted with the same key destroys the security properties. The 
optional additional authenticated data can be used to authenticate    plaintext packet 
headers. AES-GCM makes use of the AES block cipher in counter mode to provide 
encryption.  When used properly, counter mode provides   strong confidentiality [16]. 
GCM uses universal hashing in the finite field GF(2
w
 ) for generating a message 
authentication code (MAC). The additional merit of using GF(2
w
 ) is that the 
computation cost of multiplication under GF(2
w
 ) is less than integer multiplication. 
AES-GCM provides high security suitable for hardware implementation. Therefore, 
the use of AES-GCM is the best solution for resource constrained device to meet the 
security needs of IoT devices [17, 18]. Implementing AES-GCM on resource 
constrained devices with hardware software co-design approach will surely match the 
Security requirements for IoT enhancing the speed and storage area parameters. For 
prevention against replay attacks, use of different session key for encryption of 
plaintexts will help to guarantee confidentiality which can be done through GCM. 
Proposed protocol is using capability based addressing [19, 20] along with AES-GCM 
for access control of devices. Capability corresponds to row view of access control 
matrix [21].  
5    The Proposed Protocol 
In this work, we propose on device capability based authentication and access control 
protocol. Novelty of this protocol is in its cryptographic capability which acts as a 
ticket to access other device. This capability is then encrypted using AES–GCM 
which strongly provides both encryption and authentication for resource constrained 
devices. This protocol is mutual authentication protocol and it also addresses 
capability based access control. Conceptually, a capability is a token, ticket, or key 
that gives permission to access an device. A capability is implemented as a data 
structure that contains items like a unique device identifier, access rights and a 
random number, as shown in figure 2. The identifier addresses or names are single to 
device in IoT. Any device, in this context, can be equipped with RFID tags or sensor 
nodes.  The access rights define the operations that can be performed on that device.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Capability Structure 
For simplicity, it is sufficient to examine the case where a capability describes a set of 
access rights for the device. Device may also contain security attributes such as access 
rights or other access control information. A classic capability is represented as a 
ticket as:  
(Device, Rights, Random) 
 
in which the first item is the name / id of the device, second is the set of access rights 
and the third is a random number to prevent forgery. Algorithm for one way hash 
function can be made publicly available. It should be secret keys independent because 
key distribution introduces other difficulties. Benefits of using one way hash function 
are that it is computationally infeasible to inverse hash function and, given a pair of 
input and matching output it is infeasible to find a second input which gets the same 
output. When an access request arrives together with a capability consisting of object 
id, the one-way function is run to check the result against the random number to 
detect tampering. If the capability is valid, the access is granted [22]. 
 
Working of this protocol is shown in figure 3. Refer table 1 for the notations used in 
this protocol.  There are two components of this protocol: first is the creation of 
capability and second component is an application of AES – GCM. 
 
Device 1 creates its capability which is a function of device id and access rights which 
is then encrypted and hashed along with a random number to prevent forgery. 
Underlying algorithm for encryption is AES-GCM. Cipher text which is created is 
sent to device 2.  Device 2 receives the capability of device 1 in encrypted form which 
is decrypted using symmetric key. Tampering of received cipher text is verified using 
one way hash function. If the generated hash value and the received hash value do not 
match then it is evident that the communication has been tampered and some other 
device is trying to impersonate and the authentication is violated. If there is a match in 
generated hash value and received hash value after decryption, then device 1 is 
authenticated to device 2. Encryption and its hardware implementations are efficient 
in resource constrained devices due to features of AES-GCM. The computations 
overhead on device are less optimizing energy. 
As it is a mutual authentication protocol, device 2 have to authenticate itself to device 
1. For this, device 2 creates its capability by same method as explained above and 
uses the same random number sent by device 1 to prevent from replay attacks. After 
receiving this response at device1, it decrypts this cipher text and checks the integrity 
and compares the random number to ensure that this message is coming from the 
same device which is authenticated by device 1. After successful decryption and 
comparison, device 2 is authenticated to device 1 and they are free to communicate 
with each other over secure channel. It is very important to note that, access right has 
been communicated to each other securely to achieve secure access control. This 
protocol is challenge response type of protocol which alleviates the overhead on both 
the devices.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Proposed Protocol 
Table 1: Notations used in the protocol 
 
6    Evaluation 
Here we evaluate the proposed protocol in terms of its mutual authentication process, 
resistance to attack and efficiency. 
6.1   Mutual authentication 
Only legitimate devices can generate and verify capabilities as it is based on secret 
key, one way hash function .As device identifiers and secret key are private and are 
being sent in encrypted form over communication channel, it is being prevented from 
forgery. AES-GCM provides encryption and authentication to capabilities and hence 
mutual authentication is successfully validated. 
6.2   Replay attack resistance 
This resist-attack model is secure for replay attacks, as every challenge and response 
is encrypted with the random number.  
6.3   Computational, traffic and storage cost 
The proposed protocol keeps computational costs low by requiring only four hashes 
to validate tampering. To guarantee that the device is legitimate, challenge and 
response protocol proposed here sends only three parameters. Thus the traffic cost 
between two devices is low. Device needs storage cost only for storing device 
identifier and secret key. We assume here that appropriate key management is being 
used. 
7    Conclusions and Future work 
Our protocol ensures authentication and access control by adding the capabilities as a 
second line of defense. It uses a secret value S, random number r, and hash function 
h() as both static and dynamic security guards. Only a authenticated devices can 
recognize the right values of these numbers and access control is achieved correctly. 
Novelty of this protocol is in use of AES –GCM to provide both authentication and 
encryption with efficient low cost implementation in resource constrained devices.  
Future work will consist in the examination of advanced authentication protocols for 
mutual authentication. Other authentication methods (e.g. asymmetric techniques) 
should be analyzed for the suitability for resource constrained devices. The 
application range for IoT will be pushed further. To extend further, plan is to evaluate 
this protocol for different types of attacks and proposing generic and interoperable 
solution for these attacks. 
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